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Abstract
This study analyses the importance of timing reconciliation in a conflict/peace 
process in order to reach a sustainable peace. There is a main divide in how the 
different scholars in the conflict resolution field define reconciliation in being a 
goal or a process, or both. Mostly reconciliation initiatives are worked with during  
the post-settlement period but in the protracted conflicts of today the conflicts do  
not have a “wave-like” timeline and the post-conflict period maybe never comes. I 
believe that the peace building society puts to much focus on the peace agreement 
and the post-settlement period when more focus on the peace process before is 
needed. I start the thesis with an analysis on the theoretical framework and then I  
continue with a case study on Sudan. A country in an unstable post-settlement 
period. 
Keywords: reconciliation, peace process, Sudan, peace agreements, conflict 
transformation
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1 Introduction
Many peace agreements have been signed over the years but unfortunately many 
of them collapse and new conflicts arise and instability is again a fact (Lederach, 
2005: 41; Lederach, 2005: 46; Kriesberg, 2007(2)). Most of the armed conflicts  
today are internal and intractable and there are many peace workers in action 
trying to facilitate peace talks and negotiations that could lead to a sustainable  
peace. The actors are many both when it comes to the peace workers and the 
parties in the conflict itself and enemies might even be neighbours on the same  
street. If the conflict is present over a long time a culture of war is created and  
solutions are harder to reach in the web of conflicts and relationships. One 
element in a peace process and in the conflict resolution field is reconciliation. No 
matter what definition scholars in the field give to the word reconciliation 
probably most of them would agree that it is needed somehow in order to reach  
what Galtung calls a positive peace. The state when the capacity to deal with  
conflicts non-violently and creatively not only a state of absence of violence  
(Galtung, 2001: 3). Most of the time activities concerning reconciliation are 
conducted after a peace agreement has been signed. To work with reconciliation 
as a goal has been the most common. Several theoreticians argue that 
reconciliation is both a goal and a process in itself but there are differences in  
what their focus is. Concerning all the collapsed peace agreements, can timing  
reconciliation in the process be a core issue to reaching sustainable peace?
1.1 Statement of purpose
At first the purpose of this study is to analyse the theoretical framework 
concerning the timing of reconciliation initiatives in a peace/conflict process and  
discuss the different arguments stated by the scholars. In most of the cases of 
conflict-ridden societies reconciliation is something initiated in the post-conflict  
society. In spite of this we see a great deal of agreements collapsing. I will analyse  
what the scholars say about the relationship between the time of reconciliation  
initiatives and a sustainable peace. My aim is to compare the different scholars 
and hopefully contribute with some new perspective on how to approach the issue 
of timing reconciliation in a peace/conflict process.  
The purpose of the case-study is to apply some of the theories and hypothesis 
to a process that has given the people of Sudan a peace agreement that now might 
be on the edge of a collapse. I will map the reconciliation initiatives conducted in  
Sudan before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005 through a three 
level approach. The top-level, the middle-range-level and the grassroots-level. 
1
Through that approach I will be able to make a comparison between the different 
levels and compare at what stage in the timeframe they have been conducted.
  There are many different definitions about what reconciliation is and many 
ways how to work with it. But I think there is a lack of mapping the initiatives,  
especially when it comes to those conducted in the conflict process, before the 
peace agreement has been signed. I believe there is a need to know more about the 
timing of reconciliation initiatives in order to work with them in the best possible 
way.
My research questions that will lead the process in this thesis are:
Has the timing of reconciliation initiatives in Sudan affected the CPA and the  
post-settlement period?
1. What do the different reconciliation theoreticians argue about the timing of 
reconciliation initiatives?
2. Is there a connection in between a successful peace agreement and the timing 
of reconciliation initiatives according to the theoreticians in the field?
3. Have there been any reconciliation initiatives in Sudan before the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005? When and on what levels of society? 
1.2 Method
Something very important when doing a scientific research is to thoroughly 
describe what method is used to make it accessible for the readers and to be able  
to call the process scientific (Teorell; Svensson, 2007: 54). My first step in this  
thesis will be to analyse what the main reconciliation theories and hypothesis say  
about the timing of reconciliation in a peace/conflict process and then discuss the 
different scholars arguments. I will also at that point of the thesis make a short  
illustration about how scholars’ in the field define the word reconciliation and 
explain what definition I will refer to throughout this thesis. My aim is to focus a  
bit more on the theoretical discussions about the issue of timing reconciliation.  
Following the theoretical discussion I will choose the most relevant theories and  
continue down from the abstract level of research to the reality of one case 
(Teorell; Svensson, 2007:46). I will delimit my analysis and do a qualitative case  
study (Johannesen; Tufte, 2003:56). The case being the peace process which lead 
to the Comprehensive peace Agreement 2005 in Sudan.  
My ambition is to map what has been achieved when it comes to 
reconciliation initiatives in Sudan before the CPA was signed in January 2005. I 
will start the case study with a short background about why I have chosen this 
specific case and then I will analyse the case through John Paul Lederach´s 
pyramid of approaches to building peace (Lederach, 1997: 39). The pyramid 
divides society in three levels: The Top Level, the Middle-Range Level and the 
Grass-Root Level. I will map what has been initiated when it comes to  
reconciliation activities from the leadership on the different levels and make a  
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comparative study between the levels and also a comparative study of when in the 
process they have been initiated. 
1.3 Material
The material I will use for this thesis will be secondary material, both the 
theoretical and empirical. The theoretical material I have chosen from well  
recognized theoreticians in the conflict resolution field, consisting both of printed 
books and scientific articles from journals like International Journal of Peace  
Studies and Political Psychology. An example of a theoretical book that I will use 
i s Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence, edited by Mohammed Abu-Nimer. It 
consists of articles written by several other scholars. 
The empirical material I am using for the case study on Sudan is mainly 
gathered through available internet archives. To find scientific material about what  
has happened on the grass-root level is hard but I have come across a base line 
study on what has been conducted concerning local peace processes in Sudan 
from the beginning of the 80s until today. The main source for gathering empirical  
material about Sudan has been The Sudan Open Archive (www.sudanarchive.net). 
The Rift Valley Institute is the organisation behind the web site, they have a big  
network of partnerships with many academic institutes and different organisations 
which makes this possible. The empirical material, as the theoretical, not being 
primary but secondary is of course a challenge in authenticity (Teorell; Svensson, 
2007: 104). Especially when it comes to what has been conducted at the  
grassroots level in Sudan where many things are not documented. For the analysis 
on the grassroots -level I rely heavily on the base line study and their results. 
Earlier this year I visited Sudan to conduct a pre-study for a Swedish 
organisation called InterAct, together with SCC (Sudan Council of Churches) 
Northern Region. The purpose for my visit was to map what has been done 
recently concerning reconciliation initiatives in 6 specific states of Northern 
Sudan. The primary material I gathered during this study was not specifically 
made for this thesis and despite the amount of interviews made I consider them to 
not be useful for any generalisation in this thesis. The visit though and all the 
preparation around it has given me a basic knowledge about the current situation 
in Sudan and inspired me to write this thesis. 
1.4 Delimitations 
At first my intention was to conduct a comparative study in between 
reconciliation initiatives before two different agreements in Sudan but I had to 
delimitate myself in order to be able to work this thesis through. I then decided to 
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concentrate on only one peace agreement and my aim is now to compare what has  
been conducted on the different levels of society at different times in the process. 
The choice I have made in just looking at one case, and not doing a study with 
several cases, definitely limits me to making any generalisation in the broader 
perspective (Teorell; Svensson, 2007: 68). In comparing the different theories and 
hypothesis about timing reconciliation I could reach a result on what the experts  
in the field mostly argue to be the ultimate way when to work with reconciliation.  
A result on what the  empirical material says about the reconciliation initiatives in 
Sudan before 2005 is also possible to reach. Despite of the limitations for any 
broader generalisation about timing of reconciliation my hope is to contribute to 
the discussion about the place for reconciliation in the conflict resolution field. 
1.5 Theory
The theories and hypothesis I will be using in this thesis will be thoroughly gone 
through in my theoretical discussion in the first part of the thesis. My aim in 
choosing theories has been to choose those theoreticians that are the most known 
in the conflict resolution field because I believe that they reflect what is also 
conducted when it comes to reconciliation initiatives in the contemporary peace 
processes. 
There is a main divide in the field of reconciliation theories in between those 
who look upon reconciliation mainly as a goal in the process of peace and 
between those who focus on it as a process in itself (Bloomfield, 2006: 6). Among 
those who have a holistic view of reconciliation there are theoreticians that argue  
reconciliation to be the overall process where negotiations and peace agreements  
are just a part of it. And on the other side you have those who argue that 
reconciliation is the ultimate goal of the process and the main criticism against  
them is that they are idealistic and that reconciliation as an ultimate goal is not  
possible. The scholars I refer to in this thesis are all arguing differently about the  
timing of reconciliation at different stages in the time-frame of peace-building. 
The divide I make when separating them into “goal” and “process” focused 
scholars is not representing two completely different ideas in the theoretical 
framework but arguments that are more or less focused on either one. 
There are other discussions going on in the peace building field when it comes 
to reconciliation theories. One of them is the “peace versus justice” debate which 
partly has its roots in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It  
evolves around the amnesty given for truth-telling, a trade-off between justice and 
peace (Bloomfield, 2006: 18). This is also a discussion which comes out from the 
question about what is most important to focus on when it comes to building a  
sustainable peace. But I have chosen to focus on timing reconciliation and not to  
discuss this debate.
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2 Theoretical framework
Concerning reconciliation as a part of the conflict resolution field there are  
academics who look upon it as an element in the conflict resolution field as any 
other. And then we have those who argue reconciliation to be the heart of peace 
building (Ramsbotham; Woodhouse; Miall, 2005: 231). The different suggestions 
about the definition of reconciliation are many. I believe it might be because it is a  
difficult issue to work with and because it can involve many different initiatives 
that have reconciliation as the base to work from but is not necessarily called 
reconciliation initiatives. 
2.1 Definitions of reconciliation
When studying reconciliation literature the impression I get is that there are as  
many definitions as scholars writing about it and many writers almost have to 
excuse themselves at the beginning because of all the confusion about the 
definition. One of the biggest reasons for the confusion of the term reconciliation 
is the conflicting definitions about reconciliation as a process or as a goal  
(Bloomfield, 2006: 6). The scholars referring to reconciliation as a goal argue it to 
be an end-state that can be achieved. In arguing reconciliation to be a process the  
scholars either take the view of seeing it as a process that ends with reconciliation 
as a goal or they argue the process of reconciliation to be the overall process in 
peace building. Despite the different arguments about reconciliation and time I 
would still say that there are some core definitions that come back again and again 
in the theoretical framework of reconciliation. Four of them are justice, truth, 
mercy and peace (Lederach, 1997: 30; Huyse, 2003: 24; Kriesberg, 2001: 60; ). 
Lederach argues reconciliation to be the meeting-place of the four elements, 
considering reconciliation both to be a focus and a locus. A focus on relationships 
and a space for encounter (locus) for building them (Lederach, 1997: 35).  
Many of the scholars in the reconciliation field have a relationship oriented 
definition of reconciliation arguing it to be a relationship-building process 
(Bloomfield, 2006: 8). Even the conflicts themselves are somehow built on 
relationships I believe, broken ones though. The definition of reconciliation to be 
a relationship-building process is a general definition. 
Johan Galtung, one of the founders of the conflict resolution field, makes a  
short definition: “Reconciliation = Closure + Healing; closure in the sense of not 
reopening hostilities, healing in the sense of being rehabilitated” (Galtung, 2001: 
4). He has a sort of an end-state approach in this statement even if the healing 
process can go on for a long time. 
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Forgiveness is something that is central to the definition of reconciliation for 
some scholars and practitioners. Desmond Tutu, the chairman of the South  
African TRC, is one of those who believes that there is no future without 
forgiveness (Tutu, 2000). But Bloomfield argues that detaching forgiveness from 
reconciliation would make it more realistic to work with for victims who would 
not think about forgiveness as possible (Bloomfield, 2006: 25). He divides 
reconciliation into political reconciliation, a top-down process from the national  
level, and interpersonal which is a bottom-up process and argues forgiveness not 
to be an element of political reconciliation (Bloomfield, 2006: 28-29). 
Speaking about definitions of reconciliation coexistence is a term that must be 
mentioned, in many cases coexistence is referred to instead of reconciliation. 
Minimalists argue for coexistence instead of reconciliation, that people would at  
least tolerate each others existence (McCandless, 2001: 213). For enemies to 
agree on coexistence might be easier than to reconcile. It is a less loaded term that 
more people are able to accept and thought of as a more achievable end-state 
(Bloomfield, 2006: 13-14). 
Despite the different definitions of reconciliation, initiatives are promoted any 
way (Bloomfield, 2006: 10), some sort of necessity is shown in this I believe. The 
definition of reconciliation that I will refer to throughout this thesis will be a 
relationship oriented and holistic definition. Reconciliation as a process of  
relationship-building (Bloomfield, 2006: 28; McCandless, 2001: 213; Lederach, 
1997: 24), a  transformation from unjust relationships to more just ones (Assefa, 
2001: 181). Relationships both being the basis of the conflict itself and its solution  
(Lederach, 1997: 26; Fisher, 2001: 35), I consider to be the core of reconciliation. 
I will relate to Lederach´s definition of the primary goal and key contribution of  
reconciliation throughout this thesis: “...to seek innovative ways to create a time 
and a place within various levels of the affected population, to address, integrate,  
and embrace the painful past and the necessary shared future as a means of  
dealing with the present” (Lederach, 1997: 35).
2.2 Reconciliation as a goal
Referring to reconciliation as a process has become more and more common 
according to many scholars in the conflict resolution field but still the main focus 
on conducting reconciliation initiatives is in the post-conflict society 
(Ramsbotham; Woodhouse; Miall, 2005: 210). There is a major difference 
between those who suggest that reconciliation among other things is better to wait  
to work with until after the conflict has been settled and those who argue that it 
should be worked with from the start of the interventions of peace-building 
(Ramsbotham; Woodhouse; Miall, 2005: 209). When it comes to different forms 
of interventions the question about if the time is ripe arises and Johan Galtung is 
one of those who says that if it is done too early it might not work (Galtung, 2001: 
20).  The issue of victims not being ready is an argument that is being pointed out 
in this discussion (Huyse, 2003: 32). And it is a delicate issue that I believe should 
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not be left out from the discussion about the timing of reconciliation initiatives.  
But how it is being approached I believe depends on the view the practitioners and 
scholars have on the conflict and the process of building peace. The traditional 
way in the conflict resolution field is looking at the timeline of a conflict as a 
wave-like line, with the peace accord at the top and the reconciliation initiatives at  
the end (Lederach, 2005: 43; Ramsbotham; Woodhouse; Miall, 2005: 11). I  
believe that approach puts the focus on whether the time is ripe and makes it even 
more important. But considering all the intractable conflicts that involves many 
actors and which represents most of the conflicts of today the timeline is not 
wave-like but more a spiral-like timeline. When is the time then ripe if today one 
village is destroyed and the next month another? 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have been conducted after conflict-
settlement in at least 25 places since 1974 (Freeman; Hayner, 2003: 124). The 
TRC in South Africa is widely known as a way of working with reconciliation and 
is the most high profiled of it´s kind (Bloomfield, 2005: 5). What distinguished it  
from other TRCs was the official character, all the summits were open to the  
public (Tutu, 2000: 115) Desmond Tutu was the chairman of the committee and  
even if he argues reconciliation to be a long and maybe painful process that can go 
on for generations he still emphasizes forgiveness to be a crucial element but not 
the end of the process (Tutu, 2000: 286-287). I still put him with the others who 
look upon reconciliation mainly as a goal because of his focus on forgiveness as 
inevitable. The critique the South African TRC has received except for the justice 
versus peace debate is that it was a top-down approach only (Kriesberg, 2007(2):  
324). I believe it might be that it is in the post settlement period where the specific  
reconciliation approaches in the broader perspectives are possible at the, when a 
state of security has occurred.
Galtung is talking about “positive peace” as the state when also structural and  
cultural violence has ended (Ramsbotham; Woodhouse; Miall, 2005: 11, Galtung, 
2001: 3). He considers the state of positive peace to be were reconciliation can be  
reached. Reconciliation he argues to be a process with many kinds of approaches  
needed to be able to reach a closure (Galtung, 2001: 4). Galtung´s explanations of 
reconciliation show an approach to it as a process with an end state. He is one of  
the scholars that has had a great impact on how the international community has 
been working with conflict resolution in peace-building. Reconciliation being a 
part of the resolution field has most of the time been worked with in the post-
settlement period. Another scholar referring to the post-conflict society as the 
place for reconciliation is Luc Huyse. He argues that the timing of when  
reconciliation processes are initiated has an impact on the outcome but he only 
refers to the post-conflict society and there he says that most of the time other  
issues are being put first at the expense of reconciliation. (Huyse, 2003: 27) In this  
I conclude that he does not see it as something that can start earlier. But if other  
things are taking the attention of time and money in a post-conflict society, like  
Huyse argues, then reconciliation might be better to start with earlier in the 
process if reconciliation is considered to be a relationship building process.  
Having started to build a relationship I would argue it to be easier to work with  
the other issues in  a post-conflict society. 
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Mohammed Abu-Nimer though argues that reconciliation becomes most 
crucial in a post-settlement phase and that reconciliation can be reached first after  
the basic needs are met and structural changes are made (Abu-Nimer, 2001: 245-
246).  These changes do not usually occur before a conflict settlement has taken 
place. He also points out that without addressing physical reconstruction in the 
society the communities will not accept a reconciliation process (Abu-Nimer, 
2001: 247), also something that in most of the cases belongs to the post-settlement 
period. I believe that his view of the timing of reconciliation initiatives in a peace/
conflict process is that it is a matter of the post settlement period at the end of the 
conflict wave-like timeline because of all the things he brings up as necessary for 
a reconciliation process to start. He does speak of reconciliation as a process but  
comes back to the end-state approach when referring to reconciliation as  
something that can be reached and maintained. A reconciling process that leads to  
a goal when the parties are being reconciled. Abu-Nimer though argues that it is 
necessary with a functioning reconciliation process for the peace agreement to be 
implemented (Abu-Nimer, 2001: 246). He does not say that the reconciliation 
process should start earlier than the peace agreement in order to have an impact  
but to be conducted at the same time as the implementation of the agreement.
David Bloomfield, another scholar in the field, argues reconciliation to have a 
different nature on the different levels of society and that it can be an end-state at 
the personal level but not at the national, questioning if a nation can really heal 
itself (Bloomfield, 2006: 10).  But when discussing the timing of reconciliation in 
his report he argues that bottom-up approaches, both cross-community and 
individual, can start even during violence because they do not need the same 
legitimacy as the approaches on the national top-level of society (Bloomfield, 
2006: 25-26). But these bottom-up approaches are many times said to not be  
sustainable without being a part of the top-level´s framework. Bloomfield´s 
approach in dividing reconciliation in two different kinds I believe might be 
acceptable for the broader public but it is more likely that he refers to coexistence  
on the national level and not reconciliation. Something interesting though in his  
approach is that he is saying that bottom-up initiatives can be conducted even 
during violence, on the grassroots level and the community level. There is a 
dilemma though in them needing to be a part of the top-level´s framework and  
even be conducted simultaneously as top-down approaches in order to be 
sustainable. 
2.3 Reconciliation as a process
It appears that most of the scholars would argue reconciliation to be a long process 
in itself and at the same time an end-state. But there are also those who 
emphasizes on the process part. Approaching with a big perspective on 
reconciliation we have Daniel Bar-Tal who argues that reconciliation is the overall 
process where negotiations, mediation and conflict resolution are just parts of it 
(Bar-Tal, 2000: 351, 362).  But he also argues that the process of reconciliation is 
8
not needed in all conflicts but just in the protracted ones that last at least for two 
decades (Bar-Tal, 2000: 355). This is a different approach than many others who 
do consider reconciliation to be needed in order for sustainability. Considering the 
timing of reconciliation initiatives in the big process of reconciliation Bar-Tal says  
that it is a process that can start even before the negotiations themselves have 
started. When the conflict resolution process, that usually leads to a peace 
agreement, also has started and is running he argues the reconciliation process to 
become even more effective (Bar-Tal, 2000: 356). Through that statement I  
believe him to consider that simultaneous  processes are giving the best support to 
each other and not sequencing processes. Also he argues that the time should be 
ripe and have a societal climate of openness though in order for the reconciliation 
process to start (Bar-Tal, 2000: 361). So at the timeline there is a moment when 
the overall process of reconciliation starts according to Bar-Tal. 
Louis Kriesberg is referring to reconciliation as an important part in reaching a  
state of coexistence, I believe him to have a sort of minimalistic approach to  
reconciliation. He argues reconciliation to be a set of processes on different levels  
of society where people restore relationships that they believe to be minimally 
accepted and coexistence to be when they can live together without destroying 
each other (Kriesberg, 2001: 48, 60). Kriesberg has a view of that different levels 
of reconciliation can be reached and that the process can go on for several 
generations (Kriesberg, 2007(2): 322). When it comes to timing reconciliation he 
argues that actions that foster reconciliation do not need to await the ending of a  
conflict, these initiations in an early state of conflict he says might even affect the  
struggle itself in being preventive. (Kriesberg, 2007(1): 16; Kriesberg, 2007(2): 
323). I believe that the timing of reconciliation initiatives could then according to 
Kriesberg have an impact on a peace agreement and it being successful or not. He  
does argue that success is never complete for any single mediation led to an 
agreement, there will always be people on both sides not agreeing. But instead he  
points out the importance of being aware of the consequences of a number of 
different efforts made (Kriesberg, 2007(2): 247. I believe his approach of bringing 
the focus of peace building away from the peace agreement, being one of the most  
important elements in peace building, is a good challenge in exploring new  
possible ways to work.
J. Lewis Rasmussen is another scholar who is working with the United States 
Institute of Peace and their conflict management program. He, along with several 
others, also considers reconciliation both to be a process and an outcome. 
Rasmussen though has another view on relationship building and reconciliation. 
He refers to relationship building as important but as a separate part from 
reconciliation and says it can be a precursor to reconciliation (Rasmussen, 2001:  
115). So in this case he argues that relationship building could be initiated even 
during the process of negotiating a peace agreement but he does not call those 
reconciliation initiatives that for example Lederach would have done. Even if  
Rasmussen in his discussion about reconciliation and timing is referring to  
relationship building as something that must be initiated before reconciliation, he  
still considers that both of them should not be postponed until the post-settlement 
period (Rasmussen, 2001: 114). 
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John Paul Lederach is one of the best known and cited scholars and  
practitioners when it comes to reconciliation (Brounéus, 2003: 15). His 
knowledge and arguments are both based on scientific studies and primary 
experience from many years of working with reconciliation. He argues 
reconciliation to be a process that could go on for many years and generations and  
he has a broad perspective when it comes to reconciliation initiatives and time 
(Lederach, 1997: 77). The characteristics of interventions conducted by the 
international community in conflict societies are often shaped by short term and 
crisis approaches and conducted in the post-settlement phase, something that 
Lederach argues is not building a sustainable peace in divided societies. The time 
frame of peace-building and the link between the different interventions and 
initiatives must be focused on according to Lederach (Lederach, 1997: 74). He 
argues conflicts to be always present and that it is a question of transforming them 
into a spiral of peace and development instead of a spiral of violence and  
destruction (Lederach, 1997: 75). Lederach emphasizes on conflict transformation  
and not conflict resolution when it comes to peace-building. He argues peace  
agreements to be one of the platforms for conflict transformation and constructive 
social change rather than the solution and that it puts the conflict within a new 
context that requires more negotiations (Lederach, 2005: 47). Constructive social 
change in this case referring to when relationships are moving from that which 
destroys to that which builds and when relationships collapse the centre of social 
change does not hold (Lederach, 2005: 42-43, 75). Lederach considers 
relationships to be at the heart of peace-building. Concerning the timing of  
reconciliation in a peace/conflict process Lederach argues reconciliation to have a  
place in every stage of peace-building, that it is central to conflict transformation 
and that it is not limited to the post-settlement restoration period (Lederach, 1997:  
150-151). To conclude Lederach argues conflicts to be built on relationships, 
peace to be built on relationships and reconciliation initiatives to be platforms of  
relationship building that is needed throughout the whole process of conflict  
transformation. The initiatives are needed as much as the solutions. The future of 
fighting parties in protracted internal conflicts is interdependent, the relationships 
will always be there moving in some directions (Lederach, 1997: 27). 
Lederach´s theory is: “Transcending violence is forged by the capacity to 
generate, mobilize, and build the moral imagination” and “the moral imagination  
requires the capacity to imagine ourselves in a web of relationships that includes  
our enemies; the ability to sustain a paradoxical curiosity that embraces  
complexity without reliance on dualistic polarity; the fundamental belief in and  
pursuit of the creative act; and the acceptance of the inherent risk of stepping in to  
the mystery of the unknown that lies beyond the far too familiar landscape of 
violence (Lederach, 2005: 5). In putting this theory to practice he argues the actors 
on the middle-range level of society to be the most important actors in the web of  
relationships calling it the middle-out approach or web approach (Lederach, 2005:  
79-80, 82).  Not top-down or down-up approach but to start in the middle instead. 
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2.4 Conclusion
My conclusion of the framework of reconciliation is that most of the scholars refer 
to reconciliation as a process and an end-state at the same time. What divides them 
are the arguments about when reconciliation initiatives can be conducted in the 
time-frame of peace-building. I would agree with the scholars criticism against the 
thought of reconciliation as an end-state because that might be something that will 
never be possible for some people and considering relationships being the core of 
reconciliation and their need of continually being worked on to be sustained. 
Relationships are dynamic, always moving towards some direction, building or 
destroying. 
Concerning the time-frame of peace-building reconciliation has been and is 
still considered to begin where conflict resolution ends and if initiatives are begun 
before, they are just looked upon as seeds to what will come (Brounéus, 2003: 
52). Even Galtung who seems to argue reconciliation to be an end state also says  
that gathering parties around the table can even happen in war zones and some 
reconciliation takes place, but just as an introduction to the real thing (Galtung, 
2001: 21) Cease fire and peace agreement negotiated at the top-level and then the 
implementation and a possible moment of consolidation. If the peace agreement  
needs the support of the people why not start with the people to gain a base to  
stand on? Bar-Tal together with Lederach emphasizes on the specific need of 
focusing on reconciliation when it comes to intractable conflicts and not conflict  
resolution to be the core issue (Bar-Tal, 2002: 352; Lederach: 2005: 42). To speak 
about reconciliation in the field of conflict prevention and not only as part of the 
post-settlement period (Huyse, 2003: 28; Bronéus, 2003: 9), I believe we must 
consider to be important to focus on, even in violent conflict societies. But it all  
depends on what definition we give to reconciliation. 
Commitment to a relationship oriented approach always entails risk  
(Lederach, 2005: 163) but I believe it also entails gains. As stated earlier in the 
thesis I stick to the definition of reconciliation to be a relationship building 
process. The perspective I will have in approaching the case of Sudan will be 
through applying Lederach´s theory of the moral imagination and web approach 
where he argues that the middle-range level is the most important to build from. 
And the perspective of of the process as such will be the one of Bar-Tal where he  
states negotiation and mediation to be a part of the overall reconciliation process. 
The reason why I choose these perspectives to approach the case of Sudan is 
because I consider them to be the most helpful in answering my questions. Using  
the theories of reconciliation as something conducted only in the post-settlement 
period will not be appropriate to apply in the process before. 
  
11
3 Case Study Sudan
Sudan gained it´s independence from the colonial powers in 1956 and has been at 
war more or less ever since then. The conflict between the government in the 
North and the Southern armed groups has received the biggest attention. The first 
conflict lasted from 1955 to 1972 when a peace-agreement was signed in Addis 
Abeba and in 1983 the conflict arose again which lasted until 2005 when the CPA  
was signed. But it has not only been the Southerners that have been in conflict 
with the government but also other marginalized groups in the country. Sudan 
consists of a web of different conflicts rooted in its formation as a state, 
marginalisation, inequalities in the local and global economy, poor governance, 
environmental issues like drought, resources disputes, tribal issues, myriad of 
different ethnic groups and so forth. It is complex and not easy for any one to 
solve. 
3.1 Contemporary Sudan 
Sudan is in a very fragile situation at the moment concerning the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement. The biggest fear right now according to both the international 
community and the Sudanese people is that the CPA would collapse. Several 
indications that a collapse could be the case have been noted. In many parts of the  
country there is renewed fighting at the moment. The cattle-raids have taken 
another shape and become more and more hostile and unpredictable. The tribal  
fighting has even increased since the signing of the CPA and cross-border fighting 
is again a factor disturbing the peace (Thomas, 2009: 28). 
The arrest warrant for president Hassan Omar al-Bashir accusing him for a 
number of things that was issued on the 4th of March by the ICC was not making 
the situation in the country easier but the tensions right now are something built 
up from many sources. The entire region is not stable and people fear that they  
will face a regional conflict. To be able to understand the complexity of the 
conflict we need to have e regional perspective (Lederach, 1997: 12). The borders 
of Sudan have split ethnic groups since the independence and people refers 
primary to their tribes and not to what state they belong to. The tribes have been 
used by the different presidencies in the neighbouring countries in fighting each 
other. Rebel groups are just switching “commanders” more or less in the disputes 
(Giroux; Lanz; Sguaitamatti, 2009: 6-7). It is a web of conflicts not only inside 
Sudan but over the borders and in the neighbouring countries like Chad and CAR 
among others. It is a web of state and non-state actors and systems of so called 
regional conflict complexes are present where there are significant links between 
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the conflicts (Giroux; Lanz; Sguaitamatti, 2009: 2, 8). Borders that are drawn are 
not guaranteeing a peaceful coexistence especially if they separate people from 
the same tribes as in this case (Kriesberg, 2001: 51). The borders of Sudan and the 
neighbouring countries are not being controlled properly so the trade of military 
material across the borders has been easy and been facilitating the regional aspect 
of the conflicts (Giroux; Lanz; Sguaitamatti, 2009: 12). 
According to The Global Peace Index from 2008 Sudan was ranked the third 
most non-peaceful country after Iraq and Somalia (GPI, 2008: 9). The GPI has 24 
selected indicators that measures ongoing conflicts, measures societal safety and 
security and measures militarization (GPI, 2008: 5-6). There is a massive military 
build-up along the border of the North And the South of Sudan, the demarcation 
of the border is a sensitive issue concerning all the oil wells, and a lot of money is 
put on arms and redeployment of the military on both sides (Thomas, 2009: 17, 
22). 
3.2 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in Nairobi, Kenya, on the 9th of 
January 2005 between “The Government of the Republic of The Sudan” and “The 
Sudan People´s Liberation Army” ending two decades of war (1983-2005). In the 
agreement there is one short note about reconciliation that they agree to work 
wi th: “The parties agree to initiate a comprehensive process of national  
reconciliation and healing throughout the country as part of the peace building  
process. Its mechanisms and forms shall be worked out by the government of  
National Unity” (CPA, 2005: 17) This is what they agreed on initiating after the  
peace agreement had been signed but something they have neglected since then  
(Thomas, 2009: 27, 30). 
The CPA is a peace agreement that ended a long civil war in Sudan between 
the North and the South. But it was a bilateral agreement between 2 systems in a  
country with 7 different arrangements (Matus, 2006: 36). The name of the 
agreement saying it to be comprehensive is misleading when referring to the state 
of Sudan where the war between the North and the South has just been a part of a  
broader web of conflicts (Thomas, 2009: 11, 32; Al-Mahdi, 2006: 74). An 
agreement that does not consider to approach the broader society or root causes is  
very fragile (Simmons; Dixon, 2006: 63). The local conflicts in Sudan were not  
separated from the conflict between the North and the South but very much 
related anyway the CPA left a myriad of armed conflicts not being addressed  
(Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 9, 20).
Good development through the CPA has for example been the cease fire 
between the SPLA and the North, better mobility in the South, better focus on  
education and health supplies in the South (Thomas, 2009: 15). But it is at this  
moment the referendum for Southern Sudan where the Southerners will vote to 
separate or to stay united has become the most important part of the peace process  
(Thomas, 2009: 10, 27). But little is being done to be prepared for the end of the 
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interim period in July 2011, time is now critical in the case of Sudan (Thomas, 
2009: 34). But my aim in this thesis is to look at what was done in the process 
before the so called comprehensive agreement. 
3.3 Lederach´s pyramid
Lederach´s pyramid of approaches for building peace, where he has split society 
in three levels, and the way he advocates for the peace process to be rooted in the 
grassroots level or the communal level is broadly accepted by now (Ramsbotham; 
Woodhouse; Miall, 2005: 229, Fitzduff, 2001: 268-269; McCandless, 2001: 214; 
Brounéus, 2003: 32) 
On the top level we have the political 
leaders, the military leaders and the high 
religious leaders. The initiatives are high 
level negotiations and they emphasize 
reaching a cease-fire. This is also the level 
where just a few from the whole population 
are situated. On the middle-range level 
Lederach put the ethnic and religious leaders. 
The academics and the intellectuals and 
humanitarian leaders like chairmen of bigger 
NGOs. They consist of a little bit more of the population but we find the masses at  
the grassroots level. The leadership there can be many different types but for 
example we have the local leaders, community developers, refugee camp leaders,  
leaders of local NGOs and so forth. The pyramid both illustrates the levels and the 
distribution of the population in a society. (Lederach, 1997: 39-39)
What Lederach wants to emphasize is the importance of the middle-range 
leaders.  They are the connection between the top-level and the grassroots level  
and not necessary controlled by the authority (Lederach, 1997: 41-42). There are  
people who argue that a top-down approach is the best for the peace process and  
there are those who argue that the bottom-up approach is the best (Huyse, 2003: 
25). Lederach argues that more focus should be on initiatives at he middle-range 
level and also Bloomfield points out the importance of the interaction between the  
approaches that he argues will enhance the strength of both (Bloomfield, 2006: 
29). Considering the contemporary peace-building field middle-range leaders and 
grass-roots leaders play a greater role than before (Kriesberg, 2007(1): 17). 
3.4 Reconciliation Initiatives
According to a survey from 2004 reconciliation initiatives are the third most  
supported areas in peace building after political development and socio-economic 
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assistance (Bloomfield, 2006: 5). The fact that reconciliation initiatives have been 
conducted in the case of Sudan before the CPA agreement was signed is evident. I 
will analyse the timing of reconciliation initiatives on the different levels counting 
from 1983 when the conflict again arose until the signing of the CPA the 9th of 
January 2005. Considering the difficult task to separate initiatives being on the 
middle-range level or the grassroots level I have chosen to analyse the initiatives  
that are crossing the borders of the different states to be middle-range. Most of 
them have participants that refer to the criteria of middle-range leaders. There are 
several reasons why it is difficult to clearly separate the different actors in the 
processes in Sudan but the main reason is that they are many and there are actors 
that easily tend to change position. Sudan is an example of a complex web of 
actors and a complex web of conflicts. 
3.4.1  Top Level
The actors at the top-level in Sudan between 1983 and 2005 consisted mainly of 
officials from GoS and SPLM/A. Since the beginning of the 80s no specific 
reconciliation initiatives have been conducted at the top-level. But in this analysis  
I will use Daniel Bar-Tal´s approach and say that the negotiations and peace talks  
are a part of the reconciliation process as a whole (Bar-Tal, 2000: 351). In doing 
so I am not neglecting the importance of specific reconciliation initiatives at the  
top level of society, the negotiations are just one part of it. Important elements like 
communication, trust and relationship-building that are present in negotiation 
processes I would argue are very similar to some of the definitions of 
reconciliation. Negotiations on the top level are mainly a part of diplomacy which 
is an institution itself (Leguey-Feilleux, 2009: 1). But in the internal conflicts of 
today we have actors on the top level that are not a part of the organized 
institution of diplomacy but still actors in the negotiations on Lederach´s top 
level. TRCs and public apologies are examples of initiatives on the top-level of 
society (Bloomfield, 2006: 25), but that has not been conducted in Sudan. After 
the CPA was signed there were politicians expressing the need of it like As-Sadiq 
al-Mahdi, the chairman of the Umma party (Al-Mahdi, 2006: 75), but still nothing 
like the TRC has been conducted in Sudan on the national level. 
In the case of Sudan the biggest negotiation process that have had a significant 
impact on the top level has been the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development) process which led to the signing of the CPA. It started out as an 
regional initiative in 1994 then called IGADD (Intergovernmental Authority on  
Drought and Development) which led to a Declaration of Principles. IGAD is a 
regional organisation that addresses issues of common concern in the Horn of  
Africa (Prendergast, 1997: 155). The IGAD process consisted of several peace 
talks in several places though the initiative started out in 1994 the process did not  
move forward until the year of 2002. Dr Mohamed el-Mukhtar Hussein, one of 
the key members of the Government of Sudan´s delegation in Machakos and 
Naivasha, says that the relationship between John Garang and the vice-president 
Ali Osman al-Taha was a key factor in finalizing the CPA in 2005 (Hussein, 2006:  
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19). And throughout the interview with General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, who served 
as the mediator in the IGAD process, in the 18th issue of Accord I found it obvious 
that relationship-building is something very important also at the top level of  
society (Simmons; Dixon, 2006(1): 22-27). Relationship building, that most of the 
scholars consider to be the core of reconciliation, is just another element pointing  
at Bar-Tal´s theory where he argues that negotiation is just a part of the overall  
reconciliation process. 
Why did the process start again at this time, in the year of 2002 and not 
earlier? The ICG report from 2002 argues that SPLA was interested because of 
their longer-term military vulnerability, GoS because of the US war on terrorism 
and because of the difficult security situation in the oilfields, which are a great  
deal of the resources in Sudan (ICG, 2002: 15). In this report ICG also believed 
IGAD to not be capable of finalizing a peace process (ICG, 2002: 16), but that 
showed to be a wrong assumption when they signed the Machakos protocol on 
20th of July 2002 (ICG,2003: 1). But unfortunately the comprehensive element of 
the IGAD process was left out when not linking the process of Darfur and the 
Eastern part of Sudan to it (ICG, 2003: 1-2). Concerning the timing of this as a 
reconciliation initiative at first I believe the process itself went too fast, did not 
have a holistic view of the situation and the timeframe, and it was not inclusive.  
 From all the civil wars in the world that took place during the 20 th century and 
that had reconciliation events initiated, 64% did not return to war. But among 
those countries where no events were initiated only 9% did not return to war. The 
events referred to in this case are the ones conducted on the national level so this 
shows the importance of specific reconciliation initiatives on the national level. 
(Brounéus, 2003: 25) Arguing negotiation and mediation to be reconciliation 
initiatives in an overall reconciliation process does not exclude the importance of 
dealing specifically with reconciliation at the top-level of society I believe. 
3.4.2 Middle-Range Level
At the middle-range level there are the initiatives among the ethnic and religious 
leaders, academics, intellectuals and humanitarian leaders like chairmen of bigger 
NGOs.  There are three specific characteristics that Lederach describes them to 
have. First they are in contact both with the top-level leadership and the grassroots 
leadership. Second, their position is not based on military or political power. 
Third, they tend to have pre-existing relationships that cut across the lines of  
conflict, for example people with the same profession or believe but belonging to 
different sides of the conflict. (Lederach, 1997: 41-42) Lederach argues this to be 
the level where it is most important to emphasize when it comes to peace building 
and reconciliation. He considers the actors fitting the description above to be the  
key actors in building a sustainable peace. The question is what happened in  
Sudan before the CPA on the middle-range level? 
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Prendergast considered the initiatives on the middle-range level in Sudan to be  
very limited referring to what had happened before 1997 (Prendergast, 1997: 156-
157). Before 1997 an IGAD resource group had brought together Sudan experts to 
assist the IGAD process and New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) made some 
efforts to maintain contacts and build relationships between actors at the middle-
range level. The UNICEF, UNDP and the UN Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs worked with humanitarian diplomacy and problem-solving workshops 
which are a part of the approaches Lederach puts on the middle-range level 
(Prendergast, 1997: 157; Lederach, 1997: 39).
At this level something happened in 1999, more initiatives were made. The 
Wunlit Peace and Reconciliation Conference was initiated by NSCC and it ranged 
over the borders of different states, included the participation of specific ethnic 
leaders and aimed to have a broader impact of reconciliation in the South. It is the  
best known and documented initiative that took place during the war between the 
North and the South (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 158; 
NSCC, 2002: 31, 58). Paul Murphy calls it effective grassroots peace activity and 
NSCC also calls it grassroots peace-building (Murphy, 2006: 65), but considering  
the participants like military commanders, community leaders, chiefs and 
intellectuals I would argue it to belong to the middle-range level in this analysis  
(Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 18). After the Wunlit covenant 
that formed an agreement between Nuer and Dinka tribes in Upper Nile state and 
Bahr el Ghazal state, both in Southern Sudan, there were 10 more meetings that 
reaffirmed the covenant or brought further dialogues (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; 
Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006:158-169). This was a so called people-to-people 
initiative that was going to spark more and more of those especially on the 
grassroots level though. 
Concordis International is an organisation that has initiated processes to build 
relationships on the middle-range level in Sudan  starting a programme in 1999. 
Their aim was to build relationships between key players at this level in order for 
them to discuss issues in a non-threatening environment and also to get them in 
contact with the broader society. But unfortunately the relationship between these 
track-two initiatives and the IGAD process has not been close. The lack of contact 
in between the different initiatives on the different levels has been something that 
has characterized the process in Sudan before the CPA. The two leading parties, 
the SPLM/A and the GoS, excluded other parties during the whole process. 
(Simmons; Dixon, 2006: 62) 
Darfur and Kordofan were states in the North of Sudan, now they a split into 
smaller states. There were not many initiatives conducted at the middle-range 
level but between ethnic groups from these states there were 19 initiatives in  
between 1993 and 2005. But only one was held 1993 and the rest from 1999 and  
later. In these cases they were supported by the Sudan Peoples Liberation  
Movement (SPLM), the Government of Sudan (GoS), USAID, NSCC, UNDP and 
so forth. Dialogues and small negotiations that led to some good outcomes like  
written agreement of tribal leaders to work on reconciliation and restoring  
relationships and specific local agreements. (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; 
Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 161-165) The initiatives supported closely by GoS 
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or SPLM might not belong to the middle-range level considering Lederach´s  
explanations about the leadership on this level. In the case of Sudan before the 
CPA the middle-range level does not seem to have had a lot of attention. Not  
many initiatives on this level so considering Lederach´s theory this process was 
not a stable and multiplying one. No real attempts of reaching the moral  
imagination. 
3.4.3 Grassroots Level
At the lowest but the most populated level of society we have the grassroots level. 
Peace must be built also from bottom-up not only top-down approaches. A strong 
process at this level will be a threat to leaders who want to fight and it lays a 
foundation for national reconciliation (Brounéus, 2003: 37). This level represents 
people who might have a hard time on day-to-day basis struggle for survival and it 
represents people who have had a close encounter with violence. They are so 
close to the conflict itself but so far away from the tables of decision making. 
According to several of the scholars this is the level were reconciliation initiatives 
can be conducted even during violence. 
Since the second war between the North and the South began in 1983, until 
2005 when the CPA was signed, reconciliation initiatives have been conducted at 
the grassroots level and some even before that. It is hard to map all that has been 
conducted and some are not documented at all.  According to Rift Valley institute
´s base line study from 2006 many peace-building and conflict transformation 
activities have been supported in Sudan at the local level before the CPA was  
signed. They argue that the interest to support the local level was big because of 
all the potential local conflicts that could disturb the process of peace agreements  
(Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 6). Many INGOs work 
with the civil-society but in many cases it is hard to define who is a representative 
of the civil-society or not. There are cases when the traditional leaders are 
approached as being a part of the civil society and then the next day they appear to 
be warlords (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 14). 
To separate what has been conducted at the middle-range level and at the 
grassroots level is not an easy task in the myriad of peace-building efforts. The 
study from the Rift-Walley institute that has mapped local peace processes 
includes mostly the grassroots level but also the middle-range level through the 
participation of specific ethnic and religious leaders and intellectuals (Lederach,  
1997: 41). Sudan being the biggest country in Africa and with a lot of different  
leaders at different levels makes it hard to distinguish them from each other.
 Most of the initiatives at the grassroots level were conducted in Southern 
Sudan between the different ethnic groups. The only reconciliation initiatives  
conducted before the CPA was signed that included communities on the  
Government side and communities on the SPLA side was in the Nuba Mountains 
and in Abyei, areas close to the border (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-
Greenidge, 2006: 21). My aim is to analyse the timing so I will just shortly 
describe when and where initiatives were conducted. 
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The Nuba mountains are situated in the Kordofan state where 7 local 
initiatives were conducted in between 1995 and January 2005. Almost all of them 
with parties from the Nuba mountains. As mentioned earlier this was one of the 
places were people from the parties who signed the CPA were attending. The GoS, 
SPLM and UNICEF were the big initiators and some of the focus was on cross-
border and interfaith dialogues. (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 
2006: 171-173)
In Equatoria being one of the States in the South 19 local peace meetings were 
conducted in between the year of 1983 and January 2005 that accomplished 
dialogues, cessation of hostilities, return of abducted children, forgiveness, 
reconciliation in between local communities and so forth (Bradbury; Ryle; 
Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 147-150). From the initiatives 9 of them 
were held 2002 and later, which is only 3 years before the CPA was signed. Still in 
the South but closer to the border is the Upper Nile state and the documented 
initiatives there counts up to 38 meetings in the earlier mentioned time period but  
with a start in 1994. The initiatives covering for example sharing of natural 
resources, women dialogues, a covenant of Peace and Reconciliation in Liir 2000 
(Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 150-157). 
In 1997 New Sudan Council of Churches initiated a reconciliation process 
between Dinkas and Nuer in Southern Sudan (Chigas, 2007: 560). After having 
tried since the beginning of the 90s this was a successful initiative and it led to the  
Wunlit Covenant in 1999 mentioned at the middle-range level (Murphy, 2006: 
65). NSCC continued with more initiatives on the grassroots level in the Upper 
Nile area of Southern Sudan 1999/2000. The reconciliation initiatives conducted 
by the NSCC on the middle range and grassroots levels, people-to-people peace 
making, were inclusive dialogue meetings to deal with different issues. Something 
of specific interest was that in the people-to-people initiatives in Southern Sudan 
women played a leading key role (Itto, 2006: 57; NSCC, 2002: 44, 48). From the  
year of 2002 and three years ahead a Sudan Peace Fund was created by the 
USAID. The SPF started to support the people-to-people process and they were 
able to spread the initiatives (Murphy, 2006: 66). The people-to-people dialogues 
in the south preceded the negotiation talks between the South and the North but  
the dialogues were between the southerners and reconciliation between them. 
Concerning the timeline of peace building in the case of Sudan the process on the 
grassroots level started before the process on the top-level.
Between the year of 2002 and 2005 eight local peace talks were held in Bahr  
el Ghazal, another state in the South, mainly by NSCC and Sudan Peace Fund 
(SPF) but also UNICEF, PACT Sudan (Coalition of INGOs and NGOs) and 
OXFAM were supporters. The outcomes were a series of community peace 
agreements, initiations of peace councils at the local level, reconciliation and 
restoration of free movement and so forth (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-
Greenidge, 2006: 160-161). Like in Equatoria the main part of the known  
initiatives were during the last three years before the CPA. Some other grassroots 
initiatives in Bahr el Ghazal were the “peace-markets” which formed free passage 
for trade between the ethnic groups. They are considered to have prepared the 
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ground for normalisation of relations as much as sponsored peace-talks 
(Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 74-75). 
In Southern Sudan there were some general local processes that included both 
actors from the middle-range level and the grassroots level. NSCC and SPLM 
were also here the big supporters but also SPF, PACT, Norwegian Church Aid and 
Danchurchaid. For example these included dialogues between political and social 
leaders, women´s representatives, civil and military authorities, intellectuals and 
so forth. (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 174-175)
In the Northern, Eastern and Central regions there were only 4 local peace 
processes documented between 1976 and 2003 and they were mainly supported 
by GoS (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 173-174). 
Considering the local conflicts in the east of Northern Sudan this is very little  
attempts to work with reconciliation at the grassroots level. 
Darfur is the place in Sudan that absolutely has got the biggest attention in  
international media during the last years but still the situation is bad. When it  
comes to reconciliation initiatives conducted in the area of Darfur before 2005  
there seems to be many of them compared with some states of Southern Sudan, 
but still they were different. The first documented local peace process is from the 
year of 1957 but between 1983 and 2005 there were 33 initiatives in Darfur. They 
consisted of ceasefire agreements, dialogues between different ethnic groups, 
solving blood money disputes, agreements about wells and pastures but some 
were not carried through. Most of them were supported by GoS and traditional 
rulers. In 2002 there was also an agreement that brought ceasefire to the Nuba 
mountains supported by US, UK, Norway, and Switzerland  The initiatives differ 
from the initiatives in Southern Sudan concerning the aims and outcomes. In 
Southern Sudan, specifically when in comes to the people-to-people initiatives,  
many of the cases were to see a broader impact. Not only to build relationships in 
between some groups but to work with reconciliation in the entire South. And the  
initiatives in Darfur appear to have been less successful according to Bradbury (et 
al). (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 165-171)
Most of the reconciliation initiatives that were conducted at the grassroots 
level in between the year of 1983 and January 2005 were situated in Southern 
Sudan. There were very few that included representatives from both of the parties 
in the peace process at the top-level, SPLM and GoS. It is hard to measure if the 
initiatives on the grassroots level had any impact on the CPA and the IGAD 
process and the contemporary situation in Sudan. Concerning the timeframe most 
of them seem to have been conducted during the last five year before the CPA. 
Local peace-building cannot be a substitute for a national peace agreement as 
Bradbury etc. argues (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 9), 
but I would argue that a peace agreement cannot succeed without the support of 
the masses and be sustainable in a society with a protracted conflict. Local  
processes are limited in how they can affect structural changes in the society 
because of being far from the decision tables but they can still have an impact on  
the processes. The actors on the top-level of society are also somehow members 
of the grassroots level, they all come from somewhere being connected with the 
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masses. But what can make the connection better is probably what Lederach 
suggests, the middle-range actors capturing the moral imagiation.
3.5 Conclusion
In the fragile case of Sudan there have been reconciliation initiatives before the  
CPA was signed in 2005 but what is interesting in this case is the distribution of 
them on the different levels of society and the lack of connection between them. 
There were reconciliation initiatives conducted both at the top-level and at the 
grassroots level but they were not linked (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-
Greenidge, 2006: 20). The participants may learn about reconciliation and might 
even become reconciled but without dialogue and connection with the other 
levels, especially the top level with the decision makers the impact is very limited  
when it comes to the wider situation (Legey-Feilleux, 2009: 342). Lack of 
communication breeds distrust (Chigas, 2007: 564). Trust is something there is a 
big lack of in Sudan, even less now than during the war. Something that I got 
reminded of several times during my visit in Sudan earlier this year. 
 The core in Lederach´s theory about the actors at the middle-range level is  
that they are the ones keeping the web of relationships together and in this case 
there were a lack of initiatives conducted at that level. My conclusion here is that 
according to him this peace process before the CPA was weak and did not build  
sustainability. The IGAD process in itself was not inclusive and has got a lot of 
criticism because of that. The people-to-people initiatives by NSCC were first of 
all aiming at uniting the people in Southern Sudan (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; 
Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 55), and sort of not inclusive them either even if 
they aimed to unite different tribes in the south they lacked the bigger picture of  
the situation and the timeframe. 
The initiatives on the middle-range level and the grassroots level were  
conducted at the same time period as the top level talks but they were never 
directly linked (Bradbury; Ryle; Medley; Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006: 20). The 
middle-out approach was missing almost completely in the process before the 
CPA was signed. My conclusion concerning the initiatives is that one big issue 
was the lack of communication in between the levels and not so much the timing 
itself. Considering the lack of initiatives on the middle-range level the question 
about the timing comes back, what if there were no lack of them. Would the 
current situation in Sudan look different? It is important on all levels to form 
places of encounter were people can meet. Helping the parties to meet under non-
threatening informal circumstances re-humanizes the conflict and people might 
start to look at each other as human beings and not only the devil incarnate  
(Chigas, 2007: 566; Simmons; Dixon, 2006: 62)
Our focus now is on the CPA and whether it will collapse or hold for the future 
to come. No agreement ends all conflict (Kriesberg, 2007(2): 327). I believe that  
too much of attention has been given to agreements made, in the conflict 
resolution field. Conflicts will always be there, it´s a matter of transforming them 
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to be non-violent. A focus on conflict transformation rather than conflict  
resolution. There is no possibility to satisfy all parties so therefore the focus I 
believe should be on creating a place to meet in the middle of all the important 
elements of peace building. 
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4 Concluding remarks
Timing reconciliation, knowing when to start with the process is not an easy task.  
We learned in the first phase of the thesis that most of the reconciliation 
theoreticians argue reconciliation to be both a process and a goal, but also that 
some argue it to be the overall process. The timing did not only differ on the 
timeline but also from the different levels. To start earlier at the grassroots level 
was something mentioned especially by Bloomfield who divided reconciliation 
into political reconciliation and interpersonal reconciliation. The answer is that 
there are many views but some scholars like Lederach argues the timing to matter. 
When it comes to peace agreements and reconciliation the arguments ranged 
all the way from reconciliation being important to be initiated before the peace  
agreement was signed all the way to it being initiated after the peace agreement  
has been signed. If there is a connection in between a successful peace agreement 
and the timing of reconciliation is hard to generalize in this case. It would take 
many case studies to do that. But the conclusion I can make here is that the  
process that was before the CPA led to an agreement on the paper but not to a  
sustainable peace. The CPA left a web of conflicts without addressing them.  But I  
believe that Lederach would say that the moral imagination was missing during  
the process. There were initiatives conducted on the different levels but a  
connection between them was missing. In that case it is not only the timing that is  
important but also the communication between the different levels. 
In the intractable internal conflicts we have today the conflicts do not just have 
one peak but form more like circles and circles again. I would argue that the  
earlier trust is built in the relationships the better. There are lots of fears in 
protracted conflicts and trust needs to be built (Fisher, 2001: 41). If peace  
agreements are signed but no trust and relationships built people will continue to  
live in fear. It might be the long and hard way to go but reconciliation takes time,  
maybe a process that never really ends. We all live in a web of relationships either 
they are destructive or healing and growing. What matters is how we take care of 
them. And where else if not in protracted conflicts should we emphasize on them 
to take a positive turn towards a sustainable positive peace. 
For further analysis and studies I believe it is needed to explore the peace- 
building field before the settlement of an agreement and not only to put the efforts  
in the post-settlement phase. Even if there have been wars ever since the very 
beginning of life itself and people have through different approaches solved them 
or not, it still seems like we are just in the beginning of learning how to work with 
peace-building. 
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